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The Fixed Price Offer Mechanism in Trade Me Online Auctions 
1. Introduction. 
Online auction sites are used as platforms of exchange by millions of individuals, 
households and firms worldwide. From humble beginnings in 1995 when the first major 
online auction sites began to emerge, the popularity of buying and selling goods online has 
expanded rapidly to the point where the world’s largest and most well known auction site, 
eBay, now has over 86.3 million active users and facilitates nearly $60 billion of merchandise 
trade (eBay, 2008). 
Trade Me is New Zealand’s primary online auction site, having fended off non-trivial 
efforts by eBay, Amazon and Yahoo! to penetrate the local market. Trade Me is also available 
for Australian residents although eBay is Australia’s primary online auction site. The auction 
structure of Trade Me is in many respects similar to those used by eBay, Yahoo! and Amazon. 
It is an ascending bid auction where, in theory, the winner pays a price that is marginally 
higher than the willingness to pay of the bidder with the second highest valuation. There are, 
however, some important differences between the online auction designs. For example, eBay 
auctions have a “hard close” end rule whereas Amazon and Trade Me auctions extend the end 
time if bids are made within the last few minutes of the auction to allow other bidders the 
opportunity to respond. 
A substantial number of the goods listed on Trade Me do not sell successfully, either 
because there are no bids on the item or because bidding does not meet the reserve price set 
by the seller. Sell-through rates for a category of goods vary from as low as five percent 
(photographs and drawings) to as high as 70 per cent (iPods) (Trade Me, 2009b). As with 
other on-line auction sites, potential bidders can choose to become a “watcher” by 
bookmarking an item being sold. The number of watchers is known by the seller. In the event 
that an item is not sold during the auction the seller can abandon his attempt to sell the good, 
relist the good on Trade Me or another auction site, or make a fixed-price offer (hereafter 
FPO). An FPO is a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a dollar amount chosen by the seller that can be 
offered to any subset of the bidders and watchers of an auction. The first person to accept the 
FPO wins the auction. The FPO option changes the auction in two important ways. First, it 
removes the commitment value of the reserve price because the seller of a failed auction has 
an incentive to offer an FPO at a price that could be lower than the reserve price. Rational 
bidders are aware of this incentive and can adjust their bidding strategies accordingly.1 
 
1  See, for example, Menezes and Ryan (2005) for a discussion on commitment value of reserve prices. 
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Second, the FPO mechanism makes the auction nonstandard in the sense that the winner of 
the FPO part of the auction is not necessarily the bidder with the highest valuation.2 This 
implies that the auction mechanism is inefficient and that the seller is unable to extract the 
maximum possible revenue from the auction. 
eBay auctions have a feature called a “second-chance offer” that can be offered to the 
highest bidder at a price equal to her last bid, which is in contrast to the FPO that can be 
offered to all bidders and watchers at any price chosen by the seller. To win the second-
chance offer, the bidder must not only bid but also be the highest bidder (and the reserve price 
must not be met) whereas winning the FPO requires no bidding. The two mechanisms are 
likely to yield quite different outcomes due to these differences.   
Carney (2007) reports that 17% of all successful Trade Me auctions sell through the 
FPO mechanism. Despite the popularity of the FPO mechanism, no theoretical or empirical 
work has been done to establish the effects of the FPO option on auction outcomes. The aim 
of this paper is to investigate how the FPO option alters bidding behaviour, the probability of 
an auction selling, the level of the seller’s optimal reserve price and ultimately the seller’s 
expected revenue compared to a static second-price ascending auction with full commitment 
value of the reserve price. We also investigate how the number of bidders in the market 
affects the FPO outcomes. 
While there is no previous literature on fixed-price offers, a number of papers have 
addressed how other forms of post-auction seller behaviour can affect auction outcomes.  
Salmon and Wilson (2008) investigate the second-chance offer feature in multiple unit 
auctions. They find that with two bidders and two units being auctioned off only mixed 
strategy equilibria exist, because both bidders want to hide their true willingness to pay in 
hopes of being the lower bidder who receives the SCO. As far as we know, there is no 
literature on the use of SCO in single-good auctions, but it appears that the main results of this 
mechanism are easy to derive from the Revenue Equivalence Theorem formalised by 
Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981), and summarised by Klemperer (2004). As 
long as the bidders can rationally predict the secret reserve price, the SCO effectively makes 
single good eBay auctions first-price auctions until the reserve is met. The reason is that a 
proxy bid that specifies a maximum willingness to pay that is below the reserve price will 
always take the bid to that maximum bid, and thus if this is the highest bid at the end of the 
auction, the bidder would receive an SCO at her own maximum bid. If the reserve is met 
during the auction, the second-price feature is restored. Therefore, despite the SCO feature, 
the eBay auction can be classified as a standard auction where the winner is the bidder with 
the highest willingness to pay. If the bidders are risk neutral with values that are drawn from 
                                                 
2  See, for example, Krishna (2002) for a definition of a standard vs. non-standard auction. 
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an atomless strictly increasing distribution where a bidder with the lowest value expects zero 
surplus, the revenue-equivalence theorem applies and the seller’s expected revenue is the 
same as with any optimal standard static auction. 
McAfee and Vincent (1997) and Grant et. al. (2006) investigate the impact on the 
auction of the potential for relisting. Grant et. al. investigate the impact of relisting on reserve 
prices in a setting where sellers can hold a potentially infinite sequence of auctions in which 
the draw of bidders is independent from the previous draws. In their model, the reserve price 
is set higher than it would be in absence of the possibility of relisting, since the opportunity 
cost of having the auction passed in is less.  
McAfee and Vincent also consider a dynamic auction where the seller can hold an 
infinite series of second-price (and first-price) auctions, but with the same set of bidders 
participating in each run of the auction. As with the Grant et al paper, the opportunity cost of 
an auction being passed in is less than would be the case without the possibility of relisting. 
The equilibrium is also affected, however, because the opportunity cost to bidders from not 
initiating bidding is also less when passed-in goods can be relisted. In a broad class of 
distributions including the standard linear model, this second effect dominates, leading to the 
reservation price being lower than would be the case in a single-shot auction, 
The model in this paper is similar to McAfee and Vincent’s in the sense that the optimal 
response of the bidders to the possibility of post-auction activity turns out to be a crucial 
determinant of the model’s equilibrium.   
We use an independent-values model where the value of each bidder is drawn from a 
common distribution. To keep the model tractable and facilitate comparisons with other 
models, we assume a linear model. That is, we assume that the seller and all bidders are risk 
neutral and that the distribution of bidders valuations is uniform. We further impose the 
normalising assumption that the seller’s value of the good is zero, and that the support of the 
bidders’ distribution of valuations is the unit interval, [0,1].  
For the most part, our model follows the institutional set up of actual Trade Me 
auctions, but with two minor exceptions.  
First, we impose the rule that the seller sets the start price equal to the reserve. In real 
Trade Me auctions many goods are listed this way but others are listed with a secret reserve 
that is higher than the start price.3 Even when the reserve is secret, bidders can inquire about 
its level and sellers are often willing to reveal it. Furthermore, the Trade Me auction site 
informs bidders when the highest bid is within 15% of the reserve. Last, the FPO mechanism 
                                                 
3  In the former case on Trade Me auctions, a yellow flag appears by the start price indicating that the reserve 
will be met after the first bid. 
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is not tied to bids or even bidders (as it can be offered to watchers), and thus this assumption 
is not too restrictive.  
Second, we assume that the FPO is the only post-auction activity available to the seller 
outside of consuming the good at utility zero. This assumption implies that sellers cannot 
relist the good and that bidders do not expect the good to be relisted. In actual Trade Me 
auctions sellers have an option to relist their product as an alternative to offering the FPO, but 
we wish to focus our analysis solely on the impact of the FPO in this paper to isolate its 
effects from the potentially similar effects of relisting.  
Initially, we consider the model with only two bidders, and then extend it to the general 
case of n bidders. The two-bidder model gives, we hope, an easy introduction to the FPO 
auction that should be accessible to non-auction theorists, while the n-bidder game allows us 
to see how the thickness of the market affects the outcomes of the FPO auction. 
The paper is organized as follows. We present the main assumptions of the model for n 
bidders in Section 2. We solve for the two-bidder model in Section 3 and compare the results 
with those from the two-bidder model without the FPO option. We present the n-bidder model 
in Section 4, where we also discuss how increasing n influences the outcomes of the FPO 
auction. Section 5 concludes.  
2. The Model. 
There is one risk-neutral seller with a value of zero for the good he is selling. 
There are n bidders, indexed by 1,2,.,i n= . The bidders have private values drawn from 
a common uniform distribution ~ [0,1]Uiυ  with density equal to one. The distribution of 
private values is common knowledge to all bidders and the seller.  
The game has three stages. In Stage 1, the seller chooses the level of his reserve price 
and sets the starting bid equal to this reserve price. In Stage 2, bidders choose bidding 
strategies, and in Stage 3, conditional on there being no bids, the seller chooses whether to 
make a fixed-price offer and, if so, the FPO price. The seller chooses the level of his reserve 
price, R, at Stage 1 to maximize his total expected revenue of the auction, which includes the 
expected revenue from the regular auction and FPO revenue if the regular auction fails to 
meet reserve.  
Because bids below the reserve price are not possible, the auction is successful 
whenever there is at least one bid made during the Stage-2 auction. The good is then sold to 
the highest bidder at a price that equals either the second highest bid (plus a nominal margin 
which we approximate to zero) if the second highest bid is greater than or equal to R, or at a 
price equal to R if there were no other bids made. 
 The Fixed-Price Offer Mechanism in Trade Me Online Auctions 
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If no bids were made in the auction, the auction is unsuccessful or passed in and the 
seller offers an FPO at Stage 3. We assume that the FPO is the only post-auction activity 
available to the seller, so we do not allow the seller to relist the item, for example. A bidder 
accepts the FPO if i p fυ ≥ . If j  bidders have i p fυ ≥  they each have a probability, 1/j, of 
winning the FPO, so there is a lottery component in the FPO auction.  
A complete statement of the strategy space for bidders in Stage 2 is quite complicated 
since each bidder has to choose whether and how much to bid at any point in continuous time 
as a function of the history of bids to that point. The analysis, however, can be simplified by 
eliminating dominated strategies from consideration at the outset: First, given the assumption 
that the good cannot be relisted and has a value of zero to the seller, it is clearly a dominated 
strategy for him to not make a fixed-price offer. Second, because the auction rules permit 
fixed-price offers only if the Stage-2 auction fails to generate a single bid, it is a dominated 
strategy for bidders to watch rather than bid once the first bid is made. Finally, once the first-
bid is made in Stage 2, the fact that there cannot be a fixed-price offer means that this is a 
standard second-price auction, for which it is well-known that it is a dominant strategy for 
each bidder to bid her true valuation. 4  
Restricting the game by eliminating these dominated strategies, implies that in Stage 2, 
each bidder i is choosing between two strategies, which we refer to as “bid” or “watch”, 
indexed by B and W:  
Strategy B: place an auto bid, ,i ib υ=  whether or not any other bidder bids;  
Strategy W: add the auction to the watch list and place an auto bid, ,i ib υ=  only if the 
reserve is met during the auction. 
With these simplifications, the game is as follows: A strategy for the seller is a 
reservation price, R, and a fixed-price offer, ,fp to be revealed and offered in the event that no 
bids are made during the Stage-2 auction. A strategy for each bidder i is a choice between 
Strategy B and Strategy W, as a function of R and her own valuation, ˆ .iυ  
At the start of Stage 2, bidders do not know what will be the fixed-price offer ,fp
although they may be able to infer it from equilibrium reasoning. At the start of Stage 3, the 
seller only knows if any bids were placed in Stage 2, and not the exact strategies chosen by 
the bidders. Accordingly, the game has exactly the same structure as if the seller were 
required to choose the value of the fixed-price offer should the Stage-2 auction attract no bids 
at the same time as bidders choose their strategies. Stages 2 and 3 therefore constitute a 
simultaneous subgame. An equilibrium for this subgame has bidders choosing the optimal 
strategy as a function of the other bidders’ strategies, the fixed-price offer and the reservation 
                                                 
4  This result as it is well-known from Vickrey (1961) and the subsequent auction theory literature. 
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price, and the seller choosing the optimal fixed-price offer as a function of the bidders’ 
strategies and the reservation price. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for the full game is one in 
which the seller and the bidders play the equilibrium strategy for this subgame as a function 
of the reservation price, and the reservation price is set to maximise the seller’s expected 
payoff given  equilibrium response to that price.   
Our analysis of this game is simplified by the following result:  
Theorem 1:  
Any subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies has ,fp R≤  and has bidder 
strategies described by a critical valuation, ˆ ,Rυ ≥
ˆ.
common to all bidders, such that bidders 
will bid in the Stage-2 auction, if and only υ υ≥  
Proof:  
The proof of this result is somewhat technical and so is given in the Appendix.  
With this result, we use backward induction to solve for the game, finding the optimal 
fp  as a function of R and ˆ,υ  and the optimal υˆ  as a function of R and .fp  From this, we can 
find the equilibrium values of fp  and υˆ  as a function of R, and hence solve for the optimal 
R. We first present the model with just two bidders in Section 3 and subsequently extend the 
model to n bidders in Section 4. 
3. The Two-bidder Model. 
3.1 Stage 3: The Optimal Fixed-Price Offer. 
In this section we find the optimal FPO price conditional on the regular auction being 
unsuccessful. The fact of the auction not attracting any bids in the Stage 2 of the game 
implies, from Theorem 1, that none of the bidders has a valuation in excess of the cut-off 
valuation, ˆ.υ  The resulting truncated distribution is uniform, with ˆ/υ υ  being the probability 
that any bidder has a valuation no greater than .υ   
If a seller makes an FPO offer at price, ,fp  the probability that any one bidder has a 
valuation less than ,fp  and hence will not accept the offer, is ˆ/fp .υ  The probability that 
neither bidder will accept the offer is then 2ˆ)/( fp ,υ  and with the remaining probability, 
2/ ˆ1 ( ) ,fp υ−  at least one of the two bidders will accept the FPO. Thus, the expected payoff of 
the seller in Stage 3 conditional on there being no bids in Stage 2 is 
  
2
3 21 ˆ
f .f
p
pπ υ
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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Optimizing 3π  w.r.t. fp  gives the optimal price of the fixed price offer conditional on 
an unsuccessful auction: 
  * ˆ ,
3f
p υ=  (1) 
and the maximized Stage 3 profit is 
  *3
ˆ2 .
3 3
υπ =  (2) 
3.2 Stage 2: Optimal Bidder Strategies 
We start by considering the optimal strategy choice by bidder i when the fixed-price 
offer is *fp  and bidder j (  has a cutoff valuation, )i j≠ ˆ,υ  such that she will play Strategy B if 
and only if ˆ.jυ υ> 5  
Note that if ˆ,jυ υ>  bidder j will choose to initiate bidding if necessary, and there is no 
difference between Strategy B and Strategy W for bidder i. To find the optimal strategy for 
bidder i, therefore, we need only consider the case where ˆ.jυ υ≤  
Let ( )Wi iCS υ be the surplus to bidder i from following Strategy W. Conditional on the 
information that ˆ,jυ υ≤  bidder j will have a valuation less than fp  with probability, ˆ/ ,fp υ  
in which case she would not accept the FPO, and a valuation in excess of fp  with a 
probability of ˆ fp ˆ.( ) /υ υ
p
−  In the first case, bidder i would be guaranteed to be the first bidder 
to accept the FPO, if she wanted to; in the second, she would have a 0.5 probability of being 
the first to accept. If ,fiυ >  then, we have  
  
* *
*ˆ( )( ) .
ˆ ˆ
(
2
W
i i i
f f
fCS
p p
)pυ υ
υ
υ υ
⎞⎛ −= + −⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3) 
Now let ( )Bi iCS υ be the surplus to bidder i from following Strategy B. If i Rυ ≥ , bidder i 
will win the auction and pay the reserve price, R, if ;j Rυ ≤  she will win the auction and pay 
jυ if ;j iR υ υ< ≤  and she will lose the auction if .i jυ υ<  Conditional on the information that 
ˆ,jυ υ≤  the respective probabilities of these three outcomes are ˆ/ ,R υ   ˆ) /( i R ,υ υ−  and 
ˆ ˆ) / .i(υ υ υ−  We then have  
  
2 2( ) (( )( ) .
ˆ ˆ 2 2
B i i
i i i
i
iCS
R R RR R υ υ υυ υυ υυ
− + −⎛ ⎞= − + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
)
υˆ
2
 (4) 
The term, ( ) /iR υ+  in Equation (4) is the expected value of ,jυ  conditional on the 
information that .j iR υ υ< ≤   
                                                 
5  As a convention, we assume that bidders indifferent between the two strategies will play strategy W. This is 
just for expositional convenience. With a continuous distribution of bidders’ valuations, the choice of 
strategy when indifferent has no impact on any of the equilibrium variables derived in the paper.  
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Note that Equation (3) is linear and increasing in iυ  whereas Equation (4) is convex. 
The optimum cutoff valuation for bidder i is therefore given where ( ) ( ).W Bi i i iCS CSυ υ=  
Theorem 1 implies we only need search for symmetric equilibria, in which case 
ˆ( ) ( )W Bi iCS CS ˆυ υ=  for interior solutions where ˆ 1.υ <  Substituting in ˆiυ υ=  to Equations (3) 
and (4) and equating gives 
  22 * 2ˆ ( ˆ) ,fp
2Rυυ = −−
 
and hence that  
   * ˆ, if 1fp R υ= < .
From Equation (1), we then have  
  ˆ 3 , if 1.Rυ = υˆ <  (5) 
When 1/ 3,R > we have a corner solution, ˆ 1,υ =  in which neither bidder will choose 
to initiate bidding in the Stage 2 auction, no matter what their valuation. The equilibrium 
value of υˆ  can therefore be given as, 
  ˆ min{ 3 ,1}.Rυ =  (6) 
It is easy to see from Equation (6) that ˆ Rυ >  when R<1, and thus that bidders with 
values above the seller’s reserve may not bid during the regular auction. 
3.3 Stage 1: The Optimal Reserve Price.  
The expected payoff to the seller depends on the combination of valuations of the two 
bidders. If ˆiυ υ≤ for both bidders, then neither will bid and the seller will receive the Stage-3 
profit, 3.π  If at least one of the two bidders, i, has ˆ,iυ υ>  then the auction will complete in 
Stage 2, and the seller will receive either the reserve price or the lower of the two bidders’ 
valuations, whichever is greater. Conditional on the lower valuation being in the range, 
ˆ[ , ]R ,υ the expected value of this valuation is ˆ( ) / 2.R υ+  Conditional on both valuations 
exceeding ˆ,υ  the expected value of the lower of the two valuations is ˆ(2 1) / 3.υ +  The four 
possibilities and their associated expected payoffs, ,π  and probabilities, Prob, are then: 
• ˆ,iυ υ≤  for both {1,2};i∈ ˆ2 / (3 3);π υ= 2.ˆProb υ=  
• ˆ,iυ υ>  for some and {1,2},i∈ ,  ;j iR jυ ≤ ≠  ;Rπ = ˆ2 (1 ).Prob R υ= −  • ˆ,iυ υ>  for some and {1,2},i∈ ,  ;ˆjR j iυυ ≤< ≠  ˆ( ) / 2R ;υπ = + ˆ ˆ2( )(1 ).Prob Rυ υ= − −  • ˆ,iυ υ>  for both {1,2};i∈ ) ;ˆ(2 1 / 3υπ += 2ˆ(1 ) .Prob υ= −  
Incorporating the outcomes and their probabilities gives the seller’s expected payoff:  
  
3 3
2
1
ˆ ˆ1 ˆ(1 ) .
3 3 3 3
R 2υ υπ υ= + − − +  (7) 
Substituting in the equilibrium value of υˆ  from Equation (6) gives  
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2 3
1
1 12 ( 3 1) if 
3 3 .
2 1if 
3 3 3
R R R
R
π
⎧ + −⎪⎪⎨
−
=
⎪ >⎪⎩
≤
 (8) 
Optimising (8) w.r.t. R  gives the seller’s optimal reserve price: 
  * 1 .455,
3( 3 1)
R = ≈−   
so the interior solution for υˆ  is valid when the reserve price is chosen optimally, and there is 
a positive probability of the good selling during the regular auction. The seller’s payoff at the 
optimum is  
  *1 3 3
55 3 91 .402.
3 ( 3 1)
π −= ≈−   
It is interesting to compare the optimal reserve price and seller’s payoff to the model 
with no fixed-price offer. The no-FPO payoff as a function of R can be found by setting 
ˆ Rυ =  and removing the last term (which is the Stage-3 payoff) in Equation (7). Optimising 
this payoff w.r.t. R, gives the familiar result that and  The existence 
of the possibility of an FPO, then, lowers both the reserve price and the seller’s payoff.  
* 0.5R = *1 5 /12 .417.π = ≈
The effect on the reserve price is the result of two offsetting pressures. The ability to 
make an FPO lowers the opportunity cost to the seller of having an auction fail to attract any 
bids in Stage 2, and so creates an incentive to increase the reserve price. At the same time, 
however, the possibility of an FPO lowers the opportunity cost to bidders of not initiating 
bidding, creating an incentive to lower the reserve price in order to increase the probability of 
a Stage-2 sale where bidders compete up the sale price.  
The first effect can be isolated by considering a hypothetical model in which the seller 
knows that he will make an FPO if necessary, but buyers do not adjust their bidding 
behaviour in response. The seller’s payoff in this model can be found by setting ˆ Rυ =  in 
Equation (7) but retaining the last term. Optimising this payoff w.r.t. R produces an optimal R 
in excess of the 0.5 found in the no-FPO model.  
Overall, the second effect dominates, leading to a reduced reserve price as a result of the 
option for a FPO. In this respect results are analogous to those found by Grant et al (2006), 
and McAfee and Vincent (1997), referred to in the introduction, which considered a different 
form of post-auction behaviour—relisting. In the former paper, in a model constructed to have 
no endogenous response from bidder behaviour, the possibility of post-auction activity led to 
an increase in the reserve price; in the latter, the allowance for bidder response led to a 
reduction in the reserve price.  
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4. The n-Bidder Model. 
In this section we will extend the results of the 2-bidder FPO auction to n bidders. The 
main goal of this section is to see how the size of the market affects the FPO auction 
outcomes. 
4.1 Stage 3: The Optimal Fixed Price Offer. 
If the auction fails to meet the reserve in Stage 2, the seller knows that all n bidders 
must have ˆiυ υ≤ . If a seller makes an FPO offer at price, ,fp  it will not be accepted by any 
bidder at probability ˆ/ .n nfp υ  With the remaining probability / ˆ1 n nfp .υ−  at least one of the 
bidders will accept the FPO. Thus, the expected payoff of the seller in Stage 3 is 
  3 1 ˆ
n
f .fn
p
pπ υ
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (9) 
Optimizing (9) w.r.t. fp  gives the optimal fixed price offer conditional on an unsuccessful 
auction: 
  * 1
ˆ
( 1)
f
n
p
n
υ=
+
 (10) 
and the maximized Stage 3 profit is 
  *3 1
ˆ
.
( 1)
n
n
n
n
υπ +=
+
 (11) 
4.2 Stage 2: Optimal Bidder Strategies. 
As in the 2-bidder model, we are only interested in comparing the payoffs between 
Strategy B and Strategy W in the event that no other bidder initiates bidding, since that is the 
context in which the two strategies differ. We therefore consider the surplus to bidder i 
adopting each strategy, conditional on the information that the remaining n-1 bidders are 
playing Strategy W and hence have a valuation no greater than ˆ.υ   
The surplus to bidder i playing Strategy W conditional on all other bidders having 
valuations no greater than υˆ  is  
  ( ) 1* *1 1  
0
ˆ1 (
ˆ ˆ
( ) .
1
n j j
n
f fW
i i
n
ij
j
p p
p
j
CS υυ υυ
υ− −− −
=
⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎞⎛ ⎛ − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ + ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎝⎠ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ * )f−
)
 (12) 
In Equation (12), *( i fpυ −  is the surplus that would result from winning the FPO, 
1/(j+1) is the probability of winning the FPO when there are exactly j other bidders willing to 
accept it, and the remaining term in parentheses is the binomial probability of there being 
exactly j other bidders with a valuation ˆ[ , ]j fpυ υ∈  and thus be willing to accept.  
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Equation (12) can be rewritten as6  
  
*
*1
*ˆ ( ) )
)
(
( )ˆ ˆ
(
n n
iW
i
f
n
f
i
f
CS
n
.
p p
p
υυ υ υ
υ
−
⎞⎛ −= ⎟⎜⎜ −⎝ ⎠
−
⎟  (13) 
Let iυ−  be the maximum valuation of the n-1 bidders other than i. If i Rυ ≥ , bidder i’s 
surplus from playing Strategy B is ( )i Rυ − if ,i Rυ− ≤  is ( )i iυ υ−−   if ( , ),i R iυ υ− ∈  and is 0 if 
.i iυ υ− ≥  Let 1ˆ ( )nF υ−   be the distribution of the maximum of n-1 valuations, conditional on 
none having a valuation greater than ˆ.υ  For ˆ,υ υ≤  we have  
  
1
1ˆ ( ) .
ˆ
n
nF υυ υ
−
− ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
We can then write the surplus to bidder i from playing Strategy B as  
  1
0
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
iR
B n
i i i i
R
CS R dF dF
υ
1ˆ nυ υ υ υ υ−= − + −∫ ∫  υ−   (14) 
Integrating (14) by parts gives: 
  1ˆ( ) ( )
i
B n
i i
R
CS F d
υ
υ υ υ−= ∫    (15) 
If ˆ,iυ υ≤  Equation  (15) can be written as  
  
1
( )
ˆ
i n
B
i i
R
CS d
υ υυ υυ
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫
   
  1 .ˆ
n n
i
n
R
n
υ
υ −
−=  (16) 
As with the analogous equations in the two-bidder case, Equation (14) is convex in iυ  
whereas Equation (13) is linear, so again an interior solution for υˆ  is found where 
ˆ( ) ( ).W Bi iCS CS ˆυ υ=  Substituting ˆiυ υ=  into Equations (13) and (16) and equating gives  
   (17) 
* ,) ˆˆ (n n nfp υυ − = − nR
and so, again,  if *fp R= ˆ 1.υ <  
Using Equations (10) and  (17) we then have  
   (18) 1/ˆ min{( 1) ,1}.nn Rυ = +
Again, so long as R<1, we have ˆ Rυ > , implying that bidders with values above R  may 
not bid during the regular auction, and thus that the auction may close without reserve having 
been met even when there are bidders on the market with values above R. 
                                                 
6 See Hogan and Meriluoto (2010) for a proof of the equivalence between Equations (12) and (13). 
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We can also see from (18) that ˆ / n 0υ∂ ∂ <  and that ˆlim .n Rυ→∞ =  That is, as the number 
of bidders in the auction increases, each bidder is less likely to choose to watch rather than 
initiate bidding, and in the limit as n goes to infinity, no bidder whose valuation meets the 
reserve will choose to simply watch.  
4.3 Stage 1: The Optimal Reserve Price. 
Let υ  be the valuation of the winning bidder, if there is one, in the Stage-2 auction. Let 
1(nF )υ υ−   be the distribution function of the maximum valuation, ,υ  of the remaining n-1 
bidders. Since, by definition, υ  must be the highest of the n valuations, we have 
1( ) ( / )nF υ υ υ υ− =  1.n−
 
Following the same approach as used to derive Equation (16), the 
expected price paid by the winning bidder, if there is one, must therefore be  
  
1 1
0
1
[ ] ( ) (
( )
R
n n
R
n
R
E p R dF dF
F d
υ
υ
)υ υ υ υ υ υ
υ υ υ υ
− −
−
= +
= −
∫ ∫
∫
  
 
 
  (11 ) .n nn Rnυ υυ −= − − )  (19) 
The seller’s expected revenue from the Stage-2 auction, 2 ,π  is this expected price, 
averaged over the possible values of υ in the relevant range:  
  
1
2
ˆ
[ ] ( )n ,E p f d
υ
π υ υ υ= ∫  (20) 
where ( )nf υ  is the density function of the maximum valuation, .υ  Since the distribution 
function of υ is ,nυ  we have  
  1( ) .nf nυ υ −= n  (21) 
Putting Equations (19)-(21) together gives 
  ( )12
ˆ
( 1) n nn R
υ
dπ υ υ= − +∫  
  11 ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 ) .
1
nn nR
n
υ υ+−= − + −+  (22) 
The Stage-1 profit of the seller is then the sum of this Stage-2 profit and the Stage-3 
profit in Equation (11) multiplied by ˆ ,nυ  the probability of going to Stage 3: 
  
1
1
1 1
ˆ1 ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 ) .
1
( 1)
n
n n
n
n
n R
n n
υπ υ υ
+
+
+
−= − + − ++ +
n  (23) 
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Substituting for υˆ  from (18) and optimising with respect to R  gives the optimal reserve 
price: 
  *
1
1 ,
( 1) ( 1) 1n
R
n n
= ⎛+ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎞  (24) 
which, from (18), is always an interior solution. The value of marginal consumer, ˆ,υ  is given 
by 
  
( 1) 1
1ˆ .
( 1) ( 1) 1
n
n nn n
υ −= ⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
The optimal reserve and marginal-consumer valuation for different values of n are 
illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 also shows the optimal reserve price for a standard static 
auction with no FPO. This is easily derived as a special case of our model in which the seller 
maximises 2π  rather than 1π and we set ˆ Rυ =  in Equation (22). This produces the familiar 
result that independent of n. In contrast, in the FPO model, Equation *R = 0.5, (24) shows that 
the optimal reserve has * 5 ,0.R n∀<  with * / 0R n ,∂ ∂ <  2 * 2/ 0R n ,∂ ∂ >  and l   * .im 0n R→∞ =
Figure 1: Optimal Reserve and Marginal-Consumer Valuation. 
 
We can again decompose the effect of the FPO on the reserve price into the effects due 
to seller response and bidder response. The effect of the FPO on seller behaviour can be 
isolated by setting ˆ Rυ =  in Equation (23) (in effect, making the model one in which the seller 
knows that he will make an FPO if the auction fails to attract any bids in Stage 2, but bidders 
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do not know this). In the this case, the optimal reserve price would be above the 0.5 obtained 
in the no-FPO model, and would be increasing in the number of bidders. This result is also 
found by Grant et al (2006) in their model of relisting in which there bidders’ behaviour is not 
affected  by the possibility of relisting.7  
The effect on bidder behaviour can be isolated by assuming the seller maximises 2π  
rather than 1π  (a model which assumes that the seller will not make an FPO but bidders 
believe he will). It is easy to show that this produces an optimal reserve price that is lower 
than the 0.5, and sharply decreasing in n. Overall, this effect dominates. Our finding that *R  
decreases in n is in contrast to the results of relisting model of McAfee and Vincent (1997), 
where the optimal reserve price, while below that of the static one-shot model, increases in n. 
There seems to be no obvious intuition for this difference based on the distinction between an 
FPO and relisting as the form of post-auction activity. Rather the difference is just the result 
of the offsetting seller and bidder effects interacting in slightly different ways.  
We can compare how often auctions will sell through the FPO process vs. during the 
regular auction. The probability that the auction sells during Stage 2 (regular auction) is 
  *
1
( 1)
1ˆ1 1
( 1) ( 1) 1
n
n
n nn n
υ
−
− = − ,⎞⎛+ + − ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 (25) 
and the overall probability that the good is sold after Stage 3 is 
  ( )*
1
11 1
( 1) ( 1) 1
n
n
n
f
n
p
n n
− = − ⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.  (26) 
Thus, the probability of an FPO sale is the difference between (26) and (25) or 
  ( )* *
1
ˆ ˆ .
1
( 1) ( 1) 1
nn n
f n
n n
n np
n
n n
υ υ− = =+ ⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
Figure 2 illustrates the three probabilities of sale as functions of n. It also shows, for 
comparison, the probability of a sale in the standard non-FPO auction of (1  We can 
see that FPO sales are frequent in auctions with small number of bidders, but that the 
likelihood of an FPO sale diminishes fast as the number of bidders increases. The possibility 
of an FPO, however, does increase the overall probability of a sale for all n.  
0.5 ).n−
                                                 
7  The number of bidders in Grant et al is stochastic. By an increase in n in their model, therefore, we mean a 
shift in the distribution of possible n to a stochastically dominating distribution.  
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Finally, the seller’s maximum expected revenue both with and without the FPO option 
can be obtained by substituting the optimal reserve price from (24) into (23) and ˆ 0.5Rυ = =  
into Equation (22).8 In Figure 3 we show the ratio of the expected revenue from the FPO 
auction to expected revenue from an auction without the FPO option (or, equivalently, from 
an SCO auction). The FPO profit is smaller than the profit without the FPO option when n is 
small. For example, when n=2, the FPO auction generates 96.6% of the expected revenue that 
could be achieved with full reserve price commitment. This ratio improves fast, and becomes 
very close to one with 8 or more bidders. Thus, profit loss resulting from the FPO auction is 
relatively minor (at most 3.4% with our uniform distribution of bidder preferences) and this 
loss quickly disappears as the market becomes thicker. 
Figure 2: Probabilities of Sale. 
 
Figure 3: Expected Revenues. 
 
                                                 
8 The formula for the maximized expected revenue is not shown here but is trivially derived. 
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The result that the seller’s expected profit is lower with the FPO option than without it 
when bidders are fully rational is consistent with the literature on optimal auctions and 
optimal selling mechanism (see for example Riley and Samuelson (1981), Milgrom (1987) 
and Bulow and Klemperer (1996)). The main reason for this is that the FPO auction does not 
always allocate the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay (or highest marginal 
valuation) because of the lottery component that is present in the FPO stage of the game. 
Thus, by definition, this mechanism must be suboptimal to a static second-price ascending 
auction where the reserve price is set optimally.  
5. Conclusion. 
This paper investigates the effects on the bidder and seller strategies as well as the 
auction outcomes of a Fixed Price Offer (FPO) option at the end of a standard ascending bid 
auction that did not meet the reserve. The seller chooses the price of the FPO and can 
simultaneously offer it to all bidders and watchers of the auction. 
One of the main results of the paper is that the presence of the FPO option induces some 
bidders with maximum willingness to pay above the seller’s reserve to choose to follow a 
“wait-and-see” strategy of not bidding until the reserve is met. With this feature it is possible 
that the auction does not sell during the regular auction even if some bidders have values 
above the reserve price. This reduces the probability of the auction selling during the regular 
auction and, at a margin, reduces the optimal reserve price of the seller. However, the option 
to offer an FPO provides a form of insurance against the good not selling in the regular 
auction and thus, at a margin, provides the seller with an incentive to increase his reserve. The 
first effect dominates and the optimal reserve is set lower than in the absence of the FPO 
option. The optimal reserve is .455 with two bidders and falls (slowly) to zero as n  goes to 
infinity. 
The probability of the FPO sale diminishes quickly with the number of bidders. It is 
clear from these results that FPO option substantially affects the auction outcomes only when 
there are a relatively small number of bidders in the auction. 
We show that the FPO option always reduces the expected seller profit compared to a 
static auction where the reserve price has full commitment value. This result is in line with the 
Revenue Equivalence Theorem because an auction where the winner is not always the bidder 
with the highest valuation must reduce expected profit compared to an optimal standard 
auction. The negative impact of the FPO option on expected seller revenue declines with the 
number of bidders in the auction. The FPO reduces the expected profit by 3.4% when there 
are two bidders but with 8 or more bidders this reduction is almost completely eliminated. 
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The eBay Second Chance Offer (SCO) differs from the Trade Me FPO offer because the 
former allows the seller to offer the SCO to the highest bidder at her highest bid. We claim 
that the SCO auction is effectively a first-price auction until the reserve is met after which it 
becomes a second-price auction. Thus, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem should still apply 
and thus the SCO auction should yield the same expected revenue as an optimal static auction. 
Therefore, the FPO mechanism is suboptimal to the SCO mechanism. 
Our results have not clearly explained the existence of the FPO option in auctions. We 
have shown that the FPO option can at best be harmless and at worst reduces seller profit. 
Why, then, would an online auction site such as Trade Me have this design? One of our areas 
of future research is to examine if FPO could increase seller’s expected revenue when 
bidders’ entry into an auction is endogenous or when sellers are able to influence the bidders’ 
perception of the likelihood of the FPO. 
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Technical Appendix: 
This appendix contains the proof of Theorem 1, which is presented but not proved in the 
body of the paper.  
Theorem 1:  
Any subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies has ,fp R≤  and has bidder 
strategies described by a critical valuation, ˆ ,Rυ ≥
ˆ.
common to all bidders, such that bidders 
will bid in the Stage-2 auction, if and only υ υ≥  
 Proof: 
The results in this paper are derived for the special case where the distribution of 
bidders’ valuations is uniform defined over the interval, [0,1]. In this case, an implication of 
Theorem 1 is that the conditional distribution of bidders’ valuations, given the information 
that none chooses to initiate bidding is also uniform in equilibrium. To prove this, however, 
requires us to consider non-equilibrium strategies, in which case the conditional valuation 
distribution need not be uniform. Accordingly, it is notationally more convenient in this 
appendix to prove the result for the more general case in which bidders valuations are 
independent draws from some general distribution, F, defined over an interval [a,b]. In this 
proof we simply assume that bidders who are indifferent between initiating bidding and 
watching will watch. This enables us to write the best-response correspondences as functions. 
The proof is easily extended to the case were the bidders can make either choice when 
indifferent, but at the expense of a lot more notation and no additional insight.  
Let iφ  be the no-bid set of bidder i—that is, the set of valuations such that she will 
choose Strategy W. Let i−φ  denote the set of other bidders’ no-bid sets, and let the function 
( , )i R p ,f iφ −φ  denote the best-response function of bidder i. Similarly, let the function, 
( ),fp φ denote the best response of the seller as a function of the set of all bidders’ no-bid sets, 
,φ  in choosing the fixed-price offer in Stage 3.  
Note that Stages 2 and 3 of the complete game together define a simultaneous subgame. 
This is because, although the fixed-price offer is made after the Stage 2 auction, and then only 
in the event that no bidder bids at Stage 2, the seller cannot observe the strategies, ,φ at the 
time of making the offer, just the fact that no-one has bid. Accordingly, the game has exactly 
the same structure as if the seller were required to choose the value of the fixed-price offer 
should the Stage-2 auction attract no bids at the same time as bidders choose their strategies.  
A pure-strategy equilibrium for the Stage-2-and-3 subgame is a set of no-bid sets, *,φ
and a fixed-price offer, * ,fp such that 
* *( , , ) i i f iR p iφ φ −= ∀φ  and * ( *).f fp p= φ  We wish to 
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show that at any such equilibrium for this sub-game (and hence for any pure-strategy 
equilibrium of the full game) there exists υˆ  such that * ˆ[ , ] .i a iφ υ= ∀  
Let ˆ ( )j jF x φ  be the distribution of bidder j’s valuation, conditional on the information 
that she will not choose to initiate bidding, so that  
  [0, ]
( )
ˆ ( )
( )
j
j
x
j j
x
dF x
F
dF x
φ υ
φ
υ φ ∈ ∩
∈
=
∫
∫ .  
Let 1ˆ (niF υ− − )iφ  be the distribution of the maximum valuation of the n-1 bidders who are 
not bidder i, conditional on none of those n-1 bidders initiating bidding, so that  
  1ˆ ( ) (n i j
j i
F F ).jxυ φ− −
≠
=∏φ  (A1)
 
Let, (BiCS υ − )iφ  be the expected surplus to bidder i if she chooses to initiate bidding, 
conditional on the information that no other bidder will initiate. If ,Rυ < then ( )Bi iCS υ − 0.=φ  
If ,Rυ ≥  then 
  1 1ˆ ˆ) ( )ni ix dF xυ− −− 1ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 ( ).
R b
B n n
i i i i i i
a R
CS R dF x dF x
υ
υ
υ υ −− − − −= − + +∫ ∫ ∫φ φ φ φ  (A2) 
The first term in Equation (A2) reflects the fact that if no other bidder has a valuation greater 
than the reserve price, bidder i will pay the reserve. The second term reflects the nature of a 
2nd-price auction, and the third term reflects the fact that if another bidder has a higher 
valuation, bidder i will not win the auction. Integrating Equation (A2) by parts, the full 
definition of (BiCS υ )i−φ  is then 
  
1
0 if 
( ) ˆ ( ) if 
B
i i n
i i
R
R
CS
F x dx R
υ
υ
υ υ− − −
<⎧⎪= ⎨ ≥⎪⎩∫
φ φ  (A3) 
Now let ( ,i fk pπ − )iφ  be the probability that exactly k of the bidders who are not bidder 
i, will have a valuation greater than fp  conditional on their all choosing not to initiate 
bidding. Let (WiCS υ )i−φ  be the expected surplus to bidder i if she chooses to watch rather than 
bid, in the hope of winning a fixed-price offer, again conditional on the information that no 
other bidder will initiate bidding. If ,fpυ < then ( ) 0Wi iCS υ − .=φ  If ,fpυ ≥  then we have  
  
1
0
1( ) ( ) ( , )
1
n
W
i i f i f i
k
CS p k p
k
υ υ π−− −
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑φ φ .   (A4) 
Note that 1ˆ(0 , ) ( )ni f i i f ip F pπ −− = −φ φ so we can restate ( )Wi iCS υ −φ  fully as  
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  1
1
1
0 i
( ) 1ˆ( ) ( ) ( , ) if 
1
f f
W n
i i n
f i f i i f i
k
f
p
CS
p F p k p p
k
υ
υ υ π−− − − −
=
<⎧⎪= ⎛ ⎞⎨ ⎛ ⎞− + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎪ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎩ ∑
φ φ φ υ ≥
 (A5)
 
The no-bid set, ,iφ is the set of valuations, ,υ  such that ( ) ( ).W Bi i i iCS CSυ υ− −≥φ φ  
Finally, let ˆ (nF )υ φ be the distribution of the maximum valuation of all n bidders 
conditional on none of those bidders initiating bidding. With this notation, fp  is the solution 
to  
  { }ˆ( ) arg max (1 ( ) .
f
n
f f
p
p p F= − fpφ φ  (A6) 
Lemma 1:  
a) If then for each bidder, i, there exists ,fp R≤ ˆiυ  such that ˆ( , , ) [ , ] .i i f iR p a iφ υ− = ∀φ  
b) If  then for each bidder, i, either ,fp R> ˆ( , , ) [ , ] [ , ],i i f i iR p a Rφ υ υ− = ∪φ  or there exists 
i fpυ >  such that ˆ( , , ) [ , ] [ , ].i i f i iR p a Rφ υ υ− = ∪φ   
Proof:  
By definition, the no-bid set, ( , , )i i fR pφ −φ includes the interval, [a,R] (since bidders 
cannot bid below the reservation price) so we are interested in the no-bid set for valuations 
greater than R.  
From Equations (A3) and (A4), it is clear that (BiCS υ )i−φ  is weakly convex and 
monotone increasing for ,Rυ ≥ while (WiCS υ )i−φ  is linear and monotone increasing for  
.fpυ ≥   
When because we have  ,fp R<
  ( ) ( )W Bi i i iCS R CS R− −> =φ φ 0,  
the convexity of (BiCS υ − )iφ implies that it can intersect with (WiCS υ )i−φ  at at most one value 
of ,υ crossing from below. This is illustrated in Figure A1 below, showing a convex 
( )iCS −
B
i υ φ  and a linear, ( )Wi iCS υ − .φ  
When  we have  ,fp R=
  ( ) ( )W Bi i i iCS R CS R− −= =φ φ 0.  
To show the existence of a cutoff valuation, ˆ,υ  we need to show that 
( ) (W Bi i iCS CSυ − > )iυ −φ φ in a neighbourhood of υ above R. The result will then again follow 
from the convexity of ( )Bi iCS υ − .φ  Note from Equation (A3) that  
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  1( ) ˆ ( )
B
i i n
i i
CS
F R
R
υ
υυ
− −
−
∂ ==∂
φ
,φ
 
and from Equation (A5), 
  
1
1
1
( ) 1ˆ ( ) ( , )
1
W n
i i n
i f i i f i
kf
CS
F p k p
p k
υ πυυ
−− −
− −
=
∂ ⎛ ⎞= + ⎜ ⎟=∂ +⎝ ⎠∑
φ φ φ ,
 
so that, when ,fp Rυ = =  
  ( ) ( ) .
W B
i i i iCS CSυ υ
υ υ
− −∂ ∂>∂ ∂
φ φ
 
This is illustrated in Figure A2. 
Finally, Part b of the Lemma follows automatically from the fact that, when  ,fp R>
( ) ( )B Wi i i iCS CSυ υ− −>φ φ 0=  in the interval, .( , ]fR p   The two possible outcomes are shown 
in Figure A3. In one, ( ) ( )i
B
i i iCS CSυ − > W υ −φ φ  for the entire interval (R,b], and so the bidder 
would always choose to initiate bidding as long as her valuation exceeded the reservation 
price. In the other, there are two disjoint sets of valuation under which the bidder would 
choose to not initiate bidding. 
Figure A1: .fp R<  
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Figure A2: .fp R=  
 
 
Figure A3:  .fp R>
 
Lemma 2: 
There are no pure-strategy equilibria with  .fp R>
 Page 23  
 The Fixed-Price Offer Mechanism in Trade Me Online Auctions 
 Page 24  
Proof: 
First, consider the properties of  ˆ (nF υ ),φ  the distribution function for the maximum of 
the n bidders’ valuations, conditional on the information that none have chosen to initiate 
bidding. In the case where ( , , ) [ , ] i i fR p a R iφ − = ∀φ —that is, if no bidder would choose to 
watch if her valuation exceeded the reservation price, then we would have 
ˆ ( ) 1 nF υ υ= ∀ ≥φ .R  In this case, from Equation (A6), setting  would not be a best 
response.  
fp R>
Now consider the other possibility in which there is at least one bidder whose no-bid set 
is ˆ( , , ) [ , ] [ , ].i i f i iR p a Rφ υ υ− = ∪φ In this case, let *υ  be the minimum value of iυ  amongst 
those bidders. This implies that any bidder with a valuation ( , *),i Rυ υ∈  will choose to 
initiate bidding and so we will have   
  
ˆ ( )
0 ( , *),
nF
R
υ υ υυ
∂ = ∀ ∈∂
φ
 
and so, from Equation (A6) we must have either fp R≤  or *.fp υ≥  
From Lemma 1, however, if  then ,fp R> ,i fp iυ > ∀  and hence * .fpυ >  This 
contradiction establishes the proposition.  
? 
Lemma 1 and 2 together imply that any pure-strategy equilibrium must have ,fp R≤
and hence that the strategies of each bidder i can be summarised by a cut-off valuation, ˆ .iυ  
We can now describe the game amongst bidders in terms of each bidder i choosing her cut-off 
valuation, ˆ ,iυ  as a function of the cut-off valuations of the other players.  
To complete the proof of the Theorem 1, we just need to show that any pure-strategy 
equilibrium must be symmetric with all bidders having the same cut-off valuation in 
equilibrium.  
Lemma 3: 
The optimal cut-off valuation for any bidder i, is increasing in the cut-off valuation of 
any other bidder. That is,  
  
ˆ
0,  .
ˆ
i
j
j iυυ
∂ > ∀ ≠∂  
Proof:  
Define  
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  ( ) ( ) ( ),B Wi i i i i iH CS CSυ υ υ−= − −φ φ  (A7) 
so that the optimal value of iˆυ  is the solution to  
   ˆ( ) 0.i iH υ =  (A8) 
From the implicit function theorem, we wish to show that  
  
ˆ/
0.
ˆ/
i j
i i
H
H
υ
υ
∂ ∂− ∂ ∂ >
0,
 (A9) 
As shown in the proof to Lemma 2, and as illustrated in Figures A1 and A2, we have  
  ˆ/i iH υ∂ ∂ >  (A10) 
and so it remains to show that ˆ/i jH 0υ∂ ∂ < whenever ˆ( ) 0.i iH υ =   
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we can now reexpress ˆ ( )j jF υ φ  as 
  
( ) ˆif 
ˆ ˆ( )( )
ˆ1 if 
,
j
jj j
j
F
FF
υ υ υυυ φ
υ υ
⎧ ≤⎪= ⎨⎪ >⎩
  
so using Equation (A1) we have, 
  
1
1
ˆ ˆ( )( ) ˆ ( )
ˆ ˆ( )
n
j ji i n
i i
j j j
fF
F
F
υυ υυ υ
−
−∂ = −∂
φ
,φ
 
and hence, 
  
ˆ( )( )
(
ˆ ˆ( )
B
ji i B
i i
j j
fCS
CS
F
υυ υυ υ
−
−
∂ = −∂
φ
).φ  (A11) 
Now define ( ,ij f ijk pπ − )φ  as the probability that exactly k of the bidders who are not 
bidder i or j, will have a valuation greater than fp  conditional on their all choosing not to 
initiate bidding. Since the conditional probability that bidder j will have a valuation greater 
than fp is ( )ˆ1 ( ) / ( )f jF p F υ− , we can write 
  
( ) ( )
( , ) ( , ) ( 1 , ) 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
j j
i f i ij f ij ij f ij
j j
F p F p
k p k p k p
F F
π π πυ υ− − − ,
⎞⎛= + − − ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
φ φ φ  
where we define ( , ) 0 for {0... 2}.ij f ijk p k nπ − = ∉ −φ  
We can then rewrite Equation (A4) as  
  
1
0
( ) ( )
( ) ( 1 ) 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
j j
ij ijn
j jW
i i f
k
F p F p
k k
F F
CS p
k
π πυ υυ υ −−
=
.
⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎟⎜ ⋅ + − ⋅ − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠= − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑φ
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We now have  
  
1
0
( ) ( )
( ) ( 1 )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ( )( )
( )
ˆ ˆ( ) 1
j j
ij ijW n
j jji i
f
kj j
F p F p
k k
F FfCS
p
F k
π πυ υυυ υυ υ
−
−
=
⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎟⎜ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟∂ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠= − − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜∂ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑φ  
  ( )1
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 1( ) ( 1 )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 1
n
j jW
i i ij
kj j
f f
CS k
F F
υ υυ πυ υ
−
−
= k
⎞⎛= − + − ⋅⎜ +⎝ ⎟⎠∑φ  (A12) 
Putting Equations (A11) and (A12) into Equations (A7) and (A8) gives us  
  ( )1
0
ˆ( ) 1ˆ/ ( 1 )
ˆ( ) 1
n
j
i i ij
kj
f
H k
F k
υυ πυ
−
=
⎞⎛∂ ∂ = − − ⋅ <⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∑ 0,  
which is what we were seeking to show.  
? 
To complete the proof of Theorem 1 we need to show that all bidders will have the 
same cut-off valuation, ˆ.υ  This follows automatically from Lemma 3 and the fact that all 
bidders are identical (see Amir, 1996).  
  ? 
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